INFORMAZIONI BASE SUI MISSILI BALISTICI

A ballistic missile (BM) is a a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path, regardless of whether or not it is a weapon-delivery vehicle. Ballistic missiles are categorized according to their range, the maximum distance measured along the surface of the earth's ellipsoid from the point of launch of a ballistic missile to the point of impact of the last element of its payload. Various schemes are used by different countries to categorize the ranges of ballistic missiles:

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICBM

over 5500 kilometers

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

IRBM

3000 to 5500 kilometers

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

MRBM

1000 to 3000 kilometers

Short-Range Ballistic Missile

SRBM

up to 1000 kilometers

The Russian military developed a system of five range classes:

Strategic

over 1000 kilometers

Operational-Strategic

500 to 1000 kilometers

Operational

300 to 500 kilometers

Operational-Tactical

50 to 300 kilometers

Tactical

up to 50 kilometers

The 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF Treaty] required elimination of all Soviet and American longer-range intermediate nuclear force (LRINF) missiles with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers, as well as shorter-range intermediate nuclear force (SRINF) missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. The Missile Technology Control Regime initially focused on missiles with ranges greater than 300 kilometers, the range of the Soviet SCUD missile.

Delivery systems vary in their flight profile, speed of delivery, mission flexibility, autonomy, and detectability. Each of these considerations is important when planning a chemical or biological attack.

Ballistic missiles have a prescribed course that cannot be altered after the missile has burned its fuel, unless a warhead maneuvers independently of the missile or some form of terminal guidance is provided. A pure ballistic trajectory limits the effectiveness of a chemical or biological attack because, generally, the reentry speed is so high that it is difficult to distribute the agent in a diffuse cloud or with sufficient precision to ensure a release under the shear layer of the atmosphere. In addition, thermal heating upon reentry, or during release, may degrade the quality of the chemical or biological agent. U.S. experience has shown that often less than 5 percent of a chemical or biological agent remains potent after flight and release from a ballistic missile without appropriate heat shielding.

A ballistic missile also closely follows a pre-established azimuth from launch point to target. The high speed of the ballistic missile makes it difficult to deviate too far from this azimuth, even when submunitions or other dispensed bomblets are ejected from the missile during reentry. Consequently, if the target footprint axis is not roughly aligned with the flight azimuth, only a small portion of the target is effectively covered.

A ballistic missile has a relatively short flight time, and defenses against a ballistic missile attack are still less than completely effective, as proved in the Allied experience during the Gulf War. However, with sufficient warning, civil defense measures can be implemented in time to protect civil populations against chemical or biological attack. People in Tel Aviv and Riyadh received enough warning of SCUD missile attacks to don gas masks and seek shelter indoors before the missiles arrived. Even with these limitations on ballistic missile delivery of airborne agents, Iraq had built chemical warheads for its SCUDs, according to United Nations’ inspection reports.

Nuclear weapons differ markedly from chemical, biological, or conventional warheads. The principal difference is the size, shape, and inertial properties of the warhead. Generally, nuclear weapons have a lower limit on their weight and diameter, which determines characteristics of the delivery system, such as its fuselage girth. Though these limits may be small, geometric considerations often influence the selection of a delivery system. Chemical and biological weapons, which are usually fluids or dry powders, can be packed into almost any available volume. Nuclear weap-ons cannot be retrofitted to fit the available space; however, they can be designed to fit into a variety of munitions (e.g., artillery shells).

Nuclear weapons also have a different distribution of weight within the volume they occupy. Fissile material, the core of a nuclear weapon, weighs more per unit of volume than most other materials. This high specific gravity tends to concentrate weight at certain points in the flight vehicle. Since virtually all WMD delivery systems must fly through the atmosphere during a portion of their trip to a target, a designer has to consider the aerodynamic balance of the vehicle and the required size of control system to maintain a stable flight profile while carrying these concentrations of weight. Chemical, biological, and conventional weapons all have specific gravities near 1.0 gram/cc, so these materials may be placed further from the center of gravity of the vehicle without providing large compensating control forces and moments. In some special applications, such as ballistic missile reentry vehicles and artillery shells, the designer needs to include ballasting material—essentially useless weight—to balance the inertial forces and moments of the nuclear payload.

Because nuclear weapons have a large kill radius against soft and unhardened targets, accuracy is a minor consideration in the delivery system selection as long as the targeting strategy calls for countervalue attacks. Nuclear weapons destroy people and the infrastructure they occupy. They only require that the delivery system places the warhead with an accuracy of approximately 3 kilometers of a target if the weapon has a yield of 20 kilotons and to an even larger radius as the yield grows. Most un-manned delivery systems with a range of less than 500 kilometers easily meet these criteria. Often, as is the case with ballistic missiles, the quality of the control system beyond a certain performance does not materially change the accuracy of a nuclear warhead, because a large fraction of the error arises after the powered phase of the flight as the vehicle reenters the atmosphere. While this is true of chemical and biological warheads as well, with a nuclear warhead, there is less need to compensate for this error with such technologies as terminal guidance or homing reentry vehicles. To be effective, a delivery vehicle employed to spread chemical or biological agents must distribute the material in a fine cloud below a certain altitude and above the surface. It should be capable of all-weather operations and should not betray its presence to air defense assets. The United States divides missiles into four range classes.