A ballistic missile (BM) is a a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path, regardless of whether or not it is a
weapon-delivery vehicle. Ballistic missiles are categorized according to their
range, the maximum distance measured along the surface of the earth's ellipsoid
from the point of launch of a ballistic missile to the point of impact of the
last element of its payload. Various schemes are used by different countries to
categorize the ranges of ballistic missiles:
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
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ICBM
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over 5500 kilometers
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Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
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IRBM
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3000 to 5500 kilometers
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Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
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MRBM
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1000 to 3000 kilometers
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Short-Range Ballistic Missile
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SRBM
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up to 1000 kilometers
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The Russian military developed a system of five range classes:
Strategic
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over 1000 kilometers
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Operational-Strategic
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500 to 1000 kilometers
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Operational
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300 to 500 kilometers
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Operational-Tactical
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50 to 300 kilometers
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Tactical
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up to 50 kilometers
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The 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF Treaty] required elimination of all Soviet and American
longer-range intermediate nuclear force (LRINF) missiles with ranges between
1,000 and 5,500 kilometers, as well as shorter-range intermediate nuclear force
(SRINF) missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. The Missile
Technology Control Regime initially focused on missiles with ranges greater than
300 kilometers, the range of the Soviet SCUD missile.
Delivery systems vary in their flight profile, speed of delivery, mission flexibility, autonomy, and detectability. Each of these considerations is
important when planning a chemical or biological attack.
Ballistic missiles have a prescribed course that cannot be altered after the missile has burned its fuel, unless a warhead maneuvers independently of the
missile or some form of terminal guidance is provided. A pure ballistic
trajectory limits the effectiveness of a chemical or biological attack because,
generally, the reentry speed is so high that it is difficult to distribute the
agent in a diffuse cloud or with sufficient precision to ensure a release under
the shear layer of the atmosphere. In addition, thermal heating upon reentry, or
during release, may degrade the quality of the chemical or biological agent.
U.S. experience has shown that often less than 5 percent of a chemical or
biological agent remains potent after flight and release from a ballistic
missile without appropriate heat shielding.
A ballistic missile also closely follows a pre-established azimuth from launch point to target. The high speed of the ballistic missile makes it
difficult to deviate too far from this azimuth, even when submunitions or other
dispensed bomblets are ejected from the missile during reentry. Consequently, if
the target footprint axis is not roughly aligned with the flight azimuth, only a
small portion of the target is effectively covered.
A ballistic missile has a relatively short flight time, and defenses against a ballistic missile attack are still less than completely effective, as
proved in the Allied experience during the Gulf War. However, with sufficient
warning, civil defense measures can be implemented in time to protect civil
populations against chemical or biological attack. People in Tel Aviv and Riyadh
received enough warning of SCUD missile attacks to don gas masks and seek
shelter indoors before the missiles arrived. Even with these limitations on
ballistic missile delivery of airborne agents, Iraq had built chemical warheads
for its SCUDs, according to United Nations’ inspection reports.
Nuclear weapons differ markedly from chemical, biological, or conventional warheads. The principal difference is the size, shape, and inertial
properties of the warhead. Generally, nuclear weapons have a lower limit on
their weight and diameter, which determines characteristics of the delivery
system, such as its fuselage girth. Though these limits may be small, geometric
considerations often influence the selection of a delivery system. Chemical and
biological weapons, which are usually fluids or dry powders, can be packed into
almost any available volume. Nuclear weap-ons cannot be retrofitted to fit the
available space; however, they can be designed to fit into a variety of
munitions (e.g., artillery shells).
Nuclear weapons also have a different distribution of weight within the volume they occupy. Fissile material, the core of a nuclear weapon, weighs more
per unit of volume than most other materials. This high specific gravity tends
to concentrate weight at certain points in the flight vehicle. Since virtually
all WMD delivery systems must fly through the atmosphere during a portion of
their trip to a target, a designer has to consider the aerodynamic balance of
the vehicle and the required size of control system to maintain a stable flight
profile while carrying these concentrations of weight. Chemical, biological, and
conventional weapons all have specific gravities near 1.0 gram/cc, so these
materials may be placed further from the center of gravity of the vehicle
without providing large compensating control forces and moments. In some special
applications, such as ballistic missile reentry vehicles and artillery shells,
the designer needs to include ballasting material—essentially useless weight—to
balance the inertial forces and moments of the nuclear payload.
Because nuclear weapons have a large kill radius against soft and unhardened targets, accuracy is a minor consideration in the delivery system
selection as long as the targeting strategy calls for countervalue attacks.
Nuclear weapons destroy people and the infrastructure they occupy. They only
require that the delivery system places the warhead with an accuracy of
approximately 3 kilometers of a target if the weapon has a yield of 20 kilotons
and to an even larger radius as the yield grows. Most un-manned delivery systems
with a range of less than 500 kilometers easily meet these criteria. Often, as
is the case with ballistic missiles, the quality of the control system beyond a
certain performance does not materially change the accuracy of a nuclear
warhead, because a large fraction of the error arises after the powered phase of
the flight as the vehicle reenters the atmosphere. While this is true of
chemical and biological warheads as well, with a nuclear warhead, there is less
need to compensate for this error with such technologies as terminal guidance or
homing reentry vehicles. To be effective, a delivery vehicle employed to spread
chemical or biological agents must distribute the material in a fine cloud below
a certain altitude and above the surface. It should be capable of all-weather
operations and should not betray its presence to air defense assets. The United States divides missiles into four range classes.
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